I. INTRODUCTION

The famous—or rather infamous—jurisprudence, Tan-Andal v. Andal, discusses the story of Mario Victor M. Andal and Rosanna L. Tan, who were married on December 16, 1995. They had a daughter, Ma. Samantha. However, after four years of marriage, the couple separated in 2000 due to Mario’s alleged psychological incapacity. Mario initially filed for custody, asserting equal rights over Ma. Samantha, while Rosanna filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of their marriage, attributing Mario’s psychological incapacity as the cause.

During their marriage, Mario exhibited behavior suggestive of psychological issues, such as unexplained absences, financial irresponsibility, drug use, and signs of paranoia. After Rosanna gave birth, Mario’s behavior worsened; he failed to support Rosanna and their daughter and continued drug use that led to further negligence and paranoid behavior. As these issues persisted, Rosanna eventually petitioned the Regional Trial Court to commit Mario to a drug rehabilitation center.

Among the witnesses presented by Rosanna was Dr. Valentina Del Fonso-Garcia, a physician-psychiatrist. Dr. Del Fonso-Garcia was presented as an expert witness and diagnosed Mario with narcissistic antisocial personality disorder and substance abuse disorder with psychotic features. These disorders allegedly prevented Mario from fulfilling his marital and parental responsibilities.

Upon cross-examination, the expert witness admitted that she was unable to interview Mario, as he failed to appear despite the invitations she sent. Thus, she acknowledged that her evaluation was based solely on interviews with Rosanna, the couple’s child, and another witness.

Upon conclusion of the trial, the Regional Trial Court granted Rosanna’s petition to have her marriage declared void on the ground of Mario’s psychological incapacity.

However, when Mario appealed, the Court of Appeals reversed the Trial Court’s decision and held that the psychiatric findings on Mario were “unscientific and unreliable” since Mario had not been interviewed by the psychiatrist. The appellate court ruled that Dr. Del Fonso-Garcia “was working on pure suppositions and second-hand information fed to her by one side.”

When the matter was elevated to the Supreme Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari, the Supreme Court offered a new lens under which psychological incapacity should be scrutinized as a ground to nullify a marriage.

The Supreme Court granted the petition. It found clear and convincing evidence to support Rosanna’s claim of Mario’s psychological incapacity. The Court held that psychological incapacity is not limited to medically diagnosed mental disorders but also includes character traits that prevent compliance with essential marital obligations.

This case established the doctrine that psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code does not require medical or clinical identification but encompasses clear acts of dysfunctionality in personality that hinder the fulfillment of marital obligations. The Court emphatically declared that psychological incapacity is a legal concept, not a medical one.

II. REQUISITES OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

The case of Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina set the guidelines—albeit incorrectly—for defining psychological incapacity and its legal requisites. The doctrine centered on the interpretation of “psychological incapacity” under Article 36 of the Family Code, requiring it to be psychological in nature, grave, existing at the time of marriage, and incurable.

These guidelines emphasized the necessity of clearly showing these elements to protect marriage as an inviolable social institution, to wit:

1. The psychological incapacity must be shown to have existed at the time of the celebration of marriage;
2. It must be caused by a durable aspect of one’s personality structure, formed prior to the marriage;
3. It must be caused by a genuinely serious psychic cause; and
4. It must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.

The Supreme Court emphasized the need for medical or clinical identification, the existence of incapacity at the time of marriage, and its incurability.

Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, Justice Vitug wrote that psychological incapacity must be characterized by:

(a) gravity,

(b) juridical antecedence, and

(c) incurability.

III. REVIEW OF CURRENT JURISPRUDENCE

Beginning with Tan-Andal, the Supreme Court clarified that psychological incapacity, as envisioned by the Family Code Revision Committee, is—again—a legal concept. Instead of being a medical illness, psychological incapacity is “[a] durable or enduring [aspect] of a person’s personality, called ‘personality structure,’ which manifests itself through clear acts of dysfunctionality that undermine the family.” The spouse’s personality structure must render him or her unable to understand, and more importantly, to comply with essential marital obligations.

In Datu v. Datu, the Supreme Court held that:

“Psychological incapacity, a ground to void a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, is a legal, not a medical, concept. As such, it is enough that parties prove that an enduring part of their personality renders them incapable of performing their essential marital obligations. That the psychological incapacity be rooted in a particular psychological illness is no longer necessary.”

In the more recent case of Georfo v. Republic, the Supreme Court reiterated that psychiatric examination is not required in cases of psychological incapacity. In that case, the marriage was declared void based on evidence of narcissistic personality disorder traits, as testified by a clinical psychologist.

The Supreme Court has gone so far as to rule that long absence from the marital home may be sufficient to establish psychological incapacity, where it shows an inability to fulfill marital duties. Under Article 68 of the Family Code, spouses are obliged to live together and observe mutual love, respect, fidelity, and support. The lack of support for his wife and children, and unjustified absence from the family, indicated that the husband did not understand his responsibilities as a husband and father.

IV. CONCLUSION

The Court has categorically abandoned the second Molina guideline—that the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified—and held that psychological incapacity is not a medical illness requiring such identification. Expert opinion is therefore not mandatory. Instead, Tan-Andal requires proof of the enduring aspects of a person’s personality—called “personality structure”—which manifest through clear acts of dysfunctionality that undermine the family. This may be proven through the testimony of ordinary witnesses who were present in the spouses’ lives before marriage and who have consistently observed the incapacitated spouse’s behavior.

As to the incurability of psychological incapacity, the Court ruled that the requirement should be understood in the legal, not medical, sense. Legally, “incurability” means that:

“The incapacity is so enduring and persistent with respect to a specific partner, and contemplates a situation where the couple’s respective personality structures are so incompatible and antagonistic that the only result of the union would be the inevitable and irreparable breakdown of the marriage. ‘An undeniable pattern of such persisting failure [to be a present, loving, faithful, respectful, and supportive spouse] must be established so as to demonstrate that there is indeed a psychological anomaly or incongruity in the spouse relative to the other.’”

In light of the Court’s definitive declaration, expert opinion is not required to prove psychological incapacity. In summary, Tan-Andal clarified that the quantum of proof required in nullity cases is clear and convincing evidence—which requires more than a preponderance of evidence but less than proof beyond reasonable doubt. The testimony of an expert witness on the incurability of psychological incapacity is not essential. What is essential is proving acts of dysfunctionality that undermine the family such that the spouse’s personality structure makes it impossible for him or her to understand and comply with essential marital obligations. This may be proven through objective and testimonial evidence.